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Introduction 
The 12 Federal Reserve District Banks extend 
about $1  15 billion of credit within a few hours 
on an average business day, only to take it back 
again before the close of business. This huge sum 
reflects banks' daylight overdrafts of their deposit 
accounts at Federal Reserve Banks when making 
large-dollar-value payments to other banks using 
Federal Reserve wire transfer systems.'  If all 
goes well, subsequent receipts from other banks 
extinguish the daylight overdrafts before the end 
of the day. 
Daylight overdrafts via Fedwire are not allo- 
cated by any market process and are free, a result 
of the order in which a bank's payments and 
receipts occur. The same might seem to be true 
of checks presented and deposits made to any 
checking account during a day, but there is a 
crucial distinction: a Fedwire payment is irrevo- 
cable upon receipt, while a check is only a pro- 
visional payment. Therefore, the Federal Reserve 
is the party at risk if a daylight overdraft is not 
repaid by the end of a day. 
Free daylight overdrafts are costly. Of course, 
the Federal Reserve faces no  financing or resource 
costs in issuing daylight credit because it has the 
power to create money; failure of a bank to elimi- 
nate its daylight overdraft by the end of a day 
would simply add to Federal Reserve assets 
(claims on a bank) and liabilities (bank reserve 
 deposit^).^  The costs arise from resource 
misallocations. 
One source of these inefficiencies,  and the 
focus of this paper, is the "moral hazard involved 
in providing free daylight overdrafts.3 Fedwire 
fully insures a payor bank's access to whatever 
volume of daylight overdraft credit it needs to 
make payments that are immediately available 
1  These systems include Fedwire, for transfer of  reserve balances from 
one bank  to another, and the securities wire, for transfer of  bwk-entry U.S. 
government securities from one bank  to another in return for reserve balances.  W  2  Failure to repay might result from a bank's insolvency, perhaps impair. 
The  term Fedwire will be used here to refer to both systems. A third system,  ing the value of  the asset, causing a charge against Federal Reserve income 
CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payment  System), is operated by the private  that would reduce Treasury receipts. 
New York Clearing House Association; credit extended among participants in 
this system adds another $45 billion of  intebank daylight credit on  an  W  3  Stevens (1988) provides a discussion of the probable nature of some 
average day.  resource misallocations resulting from this moral hazard. 
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that removes any incentive for payee banks to 
monitor or manage credit risk in receiving pay- 
ments that payor banks fund with daylight credit. 
Suggestions have been made to price Fedwire 
daylight overdrafts in an effort to control them. 
Market sources of funding would replace some or 
all Fedwire daylight overdrafts in making pay- 
ments and would require compensation based 
on credit risk. Market discipline would then pro- 
vide the now-missing incentive for payor banks 
to attend to risk, thereby avoiding moral hazard. 
This paper suggests that economizing need not 
bring about the market discipline that would elimi- 
nate moral hazard. The first section provides a 
brief review of Fedwire daylight overdraft history, 
Federal Reserve payment system risk policy, and 
the problem of moral hazard. The second part 
shows how differences among three recently pro- 
posed daylight overdraft pricing mechanisms can 
influence the extent of daylight overdraft reduc- 
tion and, more important, the way in which banks 
reduce daylight overdrafts.  The final part argues 
that reducing Fedwire moral hazard does not 
depend on how much, but on how banks reduce 
daylight overdrafts, and that this should be  a cri- 
terion for choosing among pricing proposals. 
I.  Fedwire Daylight 
Overdrafts and 
Moral Hazard 
A bank goes into daylight overdraft when it has 
made more payments from its account at a Fed- 
eral Reserve Bank by some point during a day 
than can be covered by its opening reserve- 
deposit balance plus payments received by that 
point in the day. A common example is that of a 
bank dependent on continuous overnight 
federal-funds borrowing. Operational conve- 
nience leads it to return the borrowed funds each 
morning, before borrowing replacement funds 
in the afternoon. The midday period is spent in 
overdraft, funded by the Federal Reserve. 
As recently as 30 years ago, the U.S. large- 
dollar-value payments system was for the most 
part a cash-in-advance system. Irrevocable Fed- 
wire payments were riskless both to payees and 
to the Federal Reserve because they were drawn 
against positive balances. Since then, Federal 
Reserve daylight risk exposure has mushroomed, 
associated with the telecommunications revolu- 
tion in the payments mechanism, the prolifera- 
tion of new financial instruments, and the explo- 
sion of trading volumes in worldwide money 
and capital markets. 
A simple comparison illustrates the extent of 
the change. In 1947, reserve-deposit balances 
represented 700 percent of (seven times) the 
value of daily debits (Fedwire, checks, etc.) to 
member-bank reserve accounts. That is, the aver- 
age bank could make all of its own and its cus- 
tomers' payments for seven successive business 
days without ever receiving a single offsetting 
payment, and without exhausting its initial 
reserve-deposit balance. By 1983, balances were 
a minuscule 4 percent of daily debits. The aver- 
age bank could meet demands for payment for 
only 20 minutes of a single eight-hour business 
day before it would have to receive some offset- 
ting payments, or go into overdraft.4 
Initially, the evolution from a cash-in-advance 
system toward automatic daylight credit seems to 
have gone undetected, but confronting the grow- 
ing daylight credit risk problem became unavoid- 
able in the late 1970s under the pressures of 
technological change and a demand for same- 
day net settlement service by potentially compet- 
ing private large-dollar-value payment networks. 
Originally, starting in 1918, telegraph, telephone, 
or mail messages to the Federal Reserve were 
the only mechanisms for transferring ownership 
of reserve-deposit balances between banks with 
same-day finality. Related devices were official 
checks, offering only next-day finality, and inter- 
bank messages that simply instructed a bank to 
use Fedwire to transfer funds. 
Introducing computer-to-computer telecom- 
munications  technology for  payments  by  Fed- 
wire and by the Clearing House Interbank Pay- 
ment System (CHIPS), and for interbank 
message systems, suggested a new possibility in 
the 1970s. Private payment networks like CHIPS 
and the then-proposed CashWire network each 
would be capable of clearing payment messages 
among its own participants continuously during 
the day before presenting a single balanced set 
of net debit and credit positions to the Fed in 
time to achieve same-day final settlement. 
Compared to the next-day systems prevalent 
then, this would offer the advantage of reducing 
costly overnight float financing of banks in net 
debit position by those in net credit position. In 
addition, it would shorten the length of time 
during which overnight float exposed banks to 
credit risk. Operating details of telecommunica- 
tion devices, accounting-system modifications, 
backup facilities, and daily time schedules were 
laid out quickly, but the enterprise foundered on 
4  Reduced reserve requirements represent only a small portion of  this 
change. To  have maintained the 1947 reserve depositsldebits ratio with the 
1983 volume of debits would have involved reserve deposits equal to an 
impossible two-and-a-third times the total assets of all commercial banks. 
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v-what to do if  one of the 
participants had insufficient funds in its reserve 
account to cover its private network net debit at 
settlement hour. 
Some found the unpostable debit an opera- 
tional inconvenience to be ignored: from an 
operations perspective, it was no problem as long 
as the accounting system accepted negative 
numbers. After all, a Federal Reserve Bank did 
not check to see whether a bank had sufficient 
funds to cover a Fedwire transfer. Why should a 
net settlement message be treated any differently? 
Others found it troubling to design a system in 
which the central bank automatically would guar- 
antee a private network settlement by accepting 
an unpostable debit as an offset to irrevocable 
credits. That issue is not fully resolved even 
today, but two developments did force some 
action with respect to daylight overdrafts.5 
One development was the increasing inci- 
dence of overnight overdrafts of reserve 
accounts and adoption of the current Federal 
Reserve overnight overdraft p01icy.~  High inter- 
est rates, escalating wire-transfer traffic, and de- 
clining reserve requirements were making 
reserve-deposit accounts a less and less effective 
buffer stock in banks' daily reserve-balance man- 
agement. With no  formal overnight overdraft pol- 
icy other than Regulation D (that banks maintain 
an average required balance over a one- or two- 
week reserve maintenance period), concern was 
mounting that banks might abuse the Federal 
Reserve by running overnight overdrafts when 
especially profitable opportunities arose. 
Developing an overnight overdraft policy led 
to more widespread realization within the Fed- 
eral Reserve that daylight overdmfts were a fact 
of life. Not only was there no mechanism in 
place to prevent daylight overdrafts, but neither 
was there a way to know how widespread the 
practice was. The second development was a 
carefully constructed survey of the incidence of 
daylight overdrafts. This provided the factual 
foundation for debating and developing the 
W  5  The most recent effort to resolve the unpostable debit issue is that of 
the New York Clearing House Association, which has adopted a requirement 
that CHIPS members parlicipate  in a loss-sharing arrangement. It also has 
proposed federal legislation apparently intended to give legal priority to net- 
work payment claims over all others if a network member becomes insolvent. 
See  American Banker,  April 7,  1989,  pp. 1 and 16. 
W  6  Overnight overdrafts are subject to a penalty of  the larger of  $50, or  the 
larger of 10 percent or  a rate 2 percentage points above the federal funds rate 
prevailing on the day the overdraft is incurred. The penalty charge is in addi- 
tion to the cost of making up  the reserve-deposit deficiency for reserve- 
requirement purposes. 
initial Federal Reserve payment system risk (PSR) 
policy: guidelines for determining limits on day- 
light overdraft positions; continued recording of 
daylight overdraft positions (in addition to a real- 
time mechanism to control daylight overdrafts at 
problem banks and special institutions); and a 
stated intention to ratchet-down limits over time. 
Pricing daylight overdrafts now is being sug- 
gested as a next step for this policy. 
The problem with free Fedwire daylight over- 
drafts is moral hazard. The term refers to the 
hazard an insurer faces as a result of the elimina- 
tion of incentives for an insured party to avoid a 
risk precisely because any losses arising from 
that risk are covered by insurance. Fire, life, and 
casualty insurers protect against moral hazard in 
a variety of ways. For example, coinsurance in 
the form of deductibles or copayments gives the 
insured a stake in preventing loss; inspection 
and requirements to remove risks give the 
insurer the ability to manage risk. 
Fedwire does have some similar protections. 
The payor bank's net worth is at stake if it is 
unable to repay its credit, constituting a form of 
coinsurance. Regulation, supervision, and exam- 
ination of banks guard against imprudent bank- 
ing practices, now extended to include payment 
practices. However, initial limits on daylight 
overdraft exposure deliberately have been set 
high, and do not yet apply to overdrafts from 
book-entry securities transfers. As a result, Fed- 
wire moral hazard is real, particularly in the short 
run between bank examinations. 
Payee banks have no reason to limit payments 
received during a day, regardless of the volume 
of daylight overdrafts per dollar of net worth of 
the payor bank, because the Federal Reserve is at 
risk. Payor banks face no  external disincentives 
that would raise the cost of daylight overdraft 
credit as the volume they use increases and as 
their credit quality falls. Federal Reserve protec- 
tions against moral hazard are not yet very strong. 
II. Avoiding Daylight 
Overdrafts 
Any  bank could eliminate daylight overdrafts by 
holding more overnight reserve deposit balances, 
by borrowing balances for a few moments or 
hours during the day, or by modifying its own or 
its customers' payment practices to prevent a 
negative balance. Such adjustments might be 
costly, of course, but would be worthwhile if 
they cost less per dollar than a daylight overdraft. 
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reserves in the federal funds market. After meet- 
ing its temporary daylight need to cover pay- 
ments, the bank would then have these extra 
funds available to hold, or to loan out overnight, 
if  it could. The marginal cost of preventing a day- 
light overdraft would be the difference between 
the cost of borrowing and the return on lending. 
A private daylight loan market does not now 
operate, but such a market would provide a 
second possibility for avoiding Federal Reserve 
daylight overdrafts?  Daylight loans could redis- 
tribute existing reserve balances from banks hav- 
ing them and not needing them during the day 
for payment purposes, but only overnight for 
reserve-requirement purposes, to banks not hav- 
ing them and needing them during the day, but 
not overnight. Free Federal Reserve daylight 
credit preempts such a market now, but if day- 
light overdrafts were to become costly, and 
timely delivery were assured, borrowing in a 
daylight loan market might become an inexpen- 
sive way for a bank to prevent overdrawing its 
reserve account during a day, with repayment 
before close of business. 
Finally,  a bank could alter the amounts of debits 
and credits to its account, or their sequence dur- 
ing the day. It might do this by lengthening the 
maturity of its liabilities, or by adopting a con- 
tinuing contract for federal funds borrowing, 
with daily renegotiation of the rate but no daily 
repayment and re-receipt of funds. Or, pairs of 
institutional customers operating in securities 
markets might be induced to net their transac- 
tions obligations during a day, producing a single 
net obligation for daily payment, again reducing 
debits that might now precede credits. Or, 
groups of banks might join in private payment 
networks, substituting daylight credit on the pri- 
vate networks for Federal Reserve daylight over- 
drafts. Only net settlement of end-of-day posi- 
tions would need to be accomplished through 
Federal Reserve acc~unts.~ 
Modifying payment practices in these ways would 
involve  some costs, too, such  as  paying  higher 
rates on longer-term liabilities, or receiving 
lower prices or revenues for payment services 
when institutional customers engage in obliga- 
tion netting, or sharing the cost of a private pay- 
ment network. Some tactics would be more 
W  7  Simmons (1987) contains an extensive discussion of  daylight funds 
market possibilities. 
W  8  Humphrey (1987) and Board of  Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys- 
tem, Large-Dollar Payments System Advisory Group (1988) contain detailed 
explanations of a number of  these potential modifications  of  payment 
practices. 
expensive than others, so the marginal cost of 
preventing daylight overdrafts in reserve 
accounts by modifying payment practices would 
increase with the volume of overdrafts avoided. 
In equilibrium, cost-minimizing banks would 
adopt the unique combination of adjustment 
mechanisms having marginal costs equal to or 
less than the marginal cost of a daylight over- 
draft. Pricing daylight overdrafts would lead 
banks to adjust from today's zero marginal cost 
to something higher. 
Three Proposals to Price 
Daylight Overdrafts 
Three specific pricing proposals that have been 
receiving attention are evaluated in this se~tion.~ 
One would treat each daylight overdraft as an 
automatic overnight discount-window loan, 
booked at a penalty rate. A second would 
require a bank to hold additional balances at a 
Federal Reserve Bank in proportion to its day- 
light overdrafts. A third would simply impose a 
slight fee per dollar of daylight overdraft. 
Penalty Rate  The penalty rate proposal 
comes from Wayne Angell, member of the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. A 
bank would be required to borrow the amount 
of any daylight overdraft as a collateralized loan 
from its Federal Reserve Bank discount window 
at an above-market penalty rate, but the Federal 
Reserve Bank would pay an explicit (below- 
market) rate of return on excess reserves.1° The 
combination of the two features means that, 
under normal circumstances, no bank would run 
a daylight overdraft intentionally and pay the 
penalty discount rate, because the maximum 
alternative cost would be only the interest-rate 
spread between the cost of financing extra 
excess reserves, perhaps the federal funds rate, 
and the earnings rate on excess reserves. 
The same spread would become the cost of 
borrowing daylight funds in the likely event that 
a private daylight loan market developed. Banks 
9  These proposals are described in VanHoose (1988), the Angell proposal 
of a penalty rate; Hamdani and Wenninger (1988), supplemental balances; and 
Board of  Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Large-Dollar Payments 
System Advisory Group (1988), fees. 
10  Penalty-rate borrowing would differ from an overnight overdraft in that 
a bank would be required to post eligible collateral for the loan associated with 
a daylight overdraft, but would not involve the cost of making up a reserve- 
deposit deficiency for reserve-requirement purposes. 
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light loan because they could always borrow re- 
serves in the federal funds market and lend at the 
overnight rate; lenders would never charge less 
than this spread because they could always sell 
their reserves at the federal funds rate, of course 
forgoing the rate earned on excess reserves. 
Note, however, that excess reserves and a day- 
light loan market would be relevant only to the 
extent that daylight overdrafts were not elimi- 
nated by modifications in payment practices that 
were less costly than the rate spread." 
Supplemental Balances  The supplemental 
balance proposal has been described by the staff 
of  the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. A bank 
would be required to hold a special interest- 
bearing deposit (the supplemental balance) in a 
current period equal to some fraction (the sup- 
plemental balance ratio) of prior-period daylight 
overdrafts of its combined reserve and supple- 
mental deposit accounts. The maximum cost of a 
dollar's daylight overdraft today would be the 
supplemental balance ratio multiplied by the 
expected next-period spread between the cost of 
financing a dollar's supplemental balance and 
the rate earned on the supplemental balance. 
With both this rate spread and the ratio adminis- 
tratively fured, the maximum cost of a daylight 
overdraft would be a simple constant amount 
per dollar of daylight overdraft. 
The cost would set an upper limit on the mar- 
ket rate for daylight loans. And, as in the penalty 
rate case, supplemental balances and daylight 
lending would emerge only to the extent that 
less-expensive modifications in payment practices 
failed to eliminate daylight overdrafts. 
Banks would not use ordinary non-interest- 
bearing excess reserves to avoid daylight over- 
drafts, because the cost of financing them at the 
federal funds rate normally would be greater 
than the supplemental balance ratio times the 
rate spread. Unlike the penalty rate proposal, the 
supplemental balance approach would not 
11  Note also that the penalty rate proposal contains the seeds of a prob. 
lem for monetary policy. Extra demand for excess reserves would be matched, 
on average, by extra supply through open market operations, maintaining a 
policy-desired level of the federal funds rate, on average. However, the vana- 
bility of the federal funds rate around the average rate might increase, reflect- 
ing variations in payment needs for balances within a day, or  pemaps day-to- 
day, unrelated to reserve requirements and monetary growth. A bulge in 
payment needs that drove up the daylight loan rate during a day would drive 
up the federal funds rate by the same amount, because the ovemight earnings 
rate on excess reserves is administratively  fixed. No creditor would lend fed- 
eral funds during the day for less than the sum of  the daylight loan rate and 
the ovemight rate. As long as policymakers value the federal funds rate as a 
tool or information variable, adopting the penalty rate proposal might involve 
some risk of less-precise policy implementation. 
necessarily eliminate all daylight overdrafts. Only 
at a very low earnings rate on supplemental bal- 
ances (perhaps even a negative rate) would it be 
certain that banks would find payment-system 
modifications (or excess reserves) a cheaper way 
to avoid daylight overdrafts. 
Fees  The fee proposal has been suggested by 
the Federal Reserve System's Iarge-Dollar Pay- 
ments System Advisory Group. It would simply 
have the Federal Reserve impose a fee for Fed- 
wire overdrafts in excess of a base amount estab- 
lished for each bank. The maximum cost to a 
bank of a dollar's daylight overdraft would be 
that fee. 
Extra excess reserves would not be used in 
this case unless the fee were set higher than the 
federal funds rate. A limited daylight loan market 
could develop, redistributing the required re- 
serves of banks whose need for daylight balances 
was less than their need for required reserve 
balances. And, of course, neither daylight over- 
drafts nor daylight loans might be necessary if 
sufficient modifications in payment practices were 
forthcoming at a marginal cost less than the fee. 
In brief summary, then, each of  the three pric- 
ing proposals might be capable of eliminating Fed- 
eral Reserve daylight overdrafts entirely through 
inexpensive modifications in payment practices. 
However, if  modifying payment practices and 
redistributing required reserves through a day- 
light loan market were not sdciently  respon- 
sive to price, the outcome of  pricing would 
differ substantially among the three proposals:  . The penalty rate regime would eliminate 
all remaining daylight overdrafts by expand- 
ed holdings of excess reserves and their 
redistribution in a daylight loan market.  . The supplemental balance regime would 
eliminate some of the remaining daylight 
overdrafts by expanded holdings of 
reserves in the form of supplemental bal- 
ances and their redistribution in a daylight 
loan market.  . The fee regime would eliminate none of 
the remaining daylight overdrafts, unless 
the fee became a penalty rate. 
Ill.  Pricing and 
Moral Hazard 
Each of the three pricing proposals could reduce 
daylight overdrafts, but to what extent would they 
reduce moral hazard? None of the proposals 
would directly relate price to a bank's credit 
quality or to the volume of  its daylight overdrafts. 
Nor would any of  them introduce the kind of 
actuarial relation between price and risk expo- 
sure needed to establish an insurance fund. 
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a by-product of pricing, in some form of en- 
hanced market discipline. This could not be 
administered by payee banks on Fedwire, for they 
remain free of any risk in receiving payments. 
Results, therefore, could come only from the 
behavior of other creditors, or from eliminating 
payments requiring daylight funding. Investigat- 
ing the adjustment mechanisms banks could use 
in response to pricing, however, reveals an 
uncertain basis for expecting market discipline 
to flourish. 
Excess Reserves 
Both the penalty rate and the supplemental 
balance proposals could create a need to finance 
extra holdings of interest-bearing reserve bal- 
ances. In both proposals, the earnings rate on 
those balances would be uniform across all banks, 
but the rate paid in the market to finance the 
extra balances might vary with the credit quality 
of a payor bank. If so, then the marginal cost of 
avoiding or funding a daylight overdraft would 
vary with the credit quality of the borrowing 
bank, injecting market discipline into payments. 
Of course, moral hazard in the current deposit- 
insurance systems tends to dampen the role of 
credit quality in pricing both deposits and de- 
posit insurance, and in pricing any kind of financ- 
ing for a bank considered "too big to let fail." 
However, to the extent that a bank's marginal 
cost of funds can vary with credit quality, moral 
hazard would be diminished relative to the cur- 
rent arrangement of free daylight overdrafts. 
Daylight Loans 
Similar assertions are made about the market 
discipline of a daylight loan market: if pricing 
induced banks needing daylight funds to borrow 
them fiom banks having surplus daylight funds, 
risk premiums would emerge in daylight loan 
rates, as market scrutiny sorted borrowers by 
credit quality. 
12  Another strand of  thinking about daylight overdrafts would add a third 
qualification, also relevant to excess resewes: the "event risk problem. Credi- 
tors might not have a way to assure themselves that the debtor would not 
borrow additional sums, an event raising the riskiness of  their loans after-the- 
fact. If  this were the case, early credit would be underpriced and risk premi- 
ums too low. This is a problem for any creditor, and gives rise to restrictive 
covenants in lending agreements. To  be a serious qualification  in the daylight 
loan case, however, would require a demonstration both that the second quali- 
fication does not hold, so  that private lenders actually are at risk, and that 
covenants in standard daylight loan agreements combined with innovations in 
electronics network monitoring, such as already exist in CHIPS, could not deal 
with the problem. An elaborate treatment of  the underpricingloverlending  case 
can be found in Gelfand and Lindsey (1989). 
This argument needs two qualifications.12 One 
is that neither the supplemental balance nor, 
more especially, the fee proposal provides much 
basis for an extensive daylight loan market. Bal- 
ances available for daylight lending would be 
limited to those of banks whose need for pay- 
ment balances was less than their required, or 
required plus supplemental, reserve balances. 
This suggests only a limited stock of reserve 
deposits available for market allocation of day- 
light loans to replace free daylight overdrafts, at 
least relative to the penalty rate proposal. 
The second qualification recognizes the too- 
easy presumption that daylight lenders actually 
would be at risk. The presumption rests on an 
apparent analogy between unsecured overnight 
interbank loans in the federal funds market and 
the envisioned unsecured intraday interbank 
loans in a daylight loan market. Whatever the 
similarity between overnight and intraday lend- 
ing, it does not extend readily to risk of loss. 
Federal funds loans are risky even though their 
dominant maturity is only one day. While deposit 
insurance and the "too big to let fail" maxim 
may minimize risk, it is still possible for a bank 
to be closed, resulting in at least a delay in repay- 
ment, if not partial or complete loss of interest 
and principal to its federal funds market creditors. 
Even with assurance that a loan is for only one 
day, banks routinely impose limits on their lend- 
ing to individual banks as a matter of credit pol- 
icy, and risk premiums sometimes are required. 
Daylight loans would seem to be much closer 
to a riskless opportunity. Under what circum- 
stances could a borrower fail to repay? One is if 
regulatory authorities closed the bank during a 
day, rather than following the precedent of clos- 
ing banks only after close of business. 
Closing a bank in the midst of a day's business 
would seem exceedingly awkward in a financial 
and legal environment where the timing of 
competing claims arriving by different means 
(over the counter, mail, messenger, telephone, 
day-ahead magnetic tape, off-line telecommuni- 
cation, on-line telecommunication) is not readily 
distinguished. In fact, one by-product of pricing 
daylight overdrafts could be a standard timetable 
for posting each off-line activity to the daylight 
balance monitor, and use of that standard for 
defining priorities among claimants. Such a mon- 
itor could make intraday closings easier to 
arrange, but unless all of this were to become 
well established, authorities are not likely to 
close a bank during daylight hours. 
Ruling out unexpected daylight closings means 
that all lending and borrowing banks would have 
access to Fedwire, and could make irrevocable 
repayment of daylight loans if  they wished to do 
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the normal case, a bank uneqectedly in trouble 
would in no  way be prevented from sending 
Fedwires to repay daylight loans, even though 
that were to result in a daylight overdraft. 
It may seem ludicrous to imagine a bank bor- 
rowing in the daylight loan market in order to 
avoid a daylight overdraft, but then repaying the 
loan later the same day by going into daylight 
overdraft-except as part of a tactic calculated to 
trigger a discount-window loan or an overnight 
overdraft. Nonetheless, the point is made-that 
any bank on the ex post monitor could make 
irrevocable repayment of a daylight loan during 
banking hours if  it wanted to do so. Daylight 
loans would cany the risk of nonpayment only if 
the borrowing bank preferred to default on the 
loan rather than overdraw its account at a 
Reserve Bank. Daylight loans are riskless unless 
there are good reasons to think that any unex- 
pectedly insolvent bank would prefer default in 
the market to overdraft at the Federal Reserve 
and potential closing. 
The inexpensive technology of ex post moni- 
toring of daylight overdrafts is perfectly adequate 
for ex post booking of a penalty rate loan, or ex 
post calculating of a supplemental balance to be 
held in the future, or ex post billing of a simple 
fee. The difficulty with the technology is that it 
leaves unclear who is at risk, or perhaps makes 
only too clear who is not at risk, in interbank 
daylight lending. As long as interbank daylight 
lending is riskless, no market discipline emerges 
from it. The moral hazard of free Federal Reserve 
daylight overdrafts would remain the moral 
hazard of  private daylight loans. 
Payment Practices 
Modifying payment practices would be expected 
to reduce moral hazard. For example, as banks 
replace overnight federal funds with longer- 
maturity financing, their creditors would accept 
and demand compensation for additional risk. 
This risk formerly was accepted by the Federal 
Reserve, when daylight overdrafts provided an 
automatic means for an unexpectedly insolvent 
bank to close without having renewed its over- 
night credit. 
A different example of risk shifting is that of 
netting the many payments of two customers 
into a single obligation. This would eliminate 
moral hazard because self-interest of the parties 
in the netting process would demand risk eval- 
uation and compensation and would impose 
limits on any credit-risk exposure they might 
assume with respect to one another. 
As a third example, pricing would encourage 
the migration of payments from Fedwire to pri- 
vate networks. Moral hazard would diminish as 
payments shifted to private systems because, 
with prerequisite credit limits and loss-sharing 
agreements in place among participants, banks 
would be expected to ration and/or price net- 
work credit on the basis of credit quality. 
How Much Good  Would 
Pricing  Do? 
One thing certain is that none of the proposals 
would enlist the self-interest of payee banks 
directly in monitoring the credit quality of payor 
banks. As long as Fedwire provides irrevocable 
ownership of good funds upon receipt, payee 
banks do not extend credit in the Fedwire pay- 
ment process, are not at risk, and have no incen- 
tive to monitor the credit quality of payor banks. 
Market discipline would have to originate 
from other pressures on payor banks to manage 
payment risks. That said, the most crucial 
unknown factor is the rate at which the marginal 
cost of modifying payment practices rises as the 
volume of eliminated daylight overdrafts 
increases. If  this marginal cost rises relatively 
slowly, so that inexpensive modifications effec- 
tively will eliminate all Fedwire daylight over- 
drafts, then moral hazard should disappear, sup- 
planted by the market discipline of risk-sharing 
agreements in private payment networks, by net- 
ting agreements among banks' customers, and 
by the risk aversion of banks' creditors (and, 
perhaps in the future, of banks' insurers). 
On the other hand, if  this marginal cost rises 
relatively rapidly, the major burden of rationing 
daylight overdrafts would have to be borne 
through the direct mechanism of a pricing 
scheme. In this event, conjecture becomes 
somewhat more dependable -  at least concern- 
ing the relative strengths of the three proposals. 
The penalty rate proposal, while eliminating 
daylight overdrafts altogether, is not likely to be 
effective in removing moral hazard. Ex  post day- 
light overdraft monitoring would leave the Fed- 
eral Reserve bearing the credit risk of an active 
interbank daylight loan market, redistributing a 
much enlarged volume of excess reserves. High- 
quality banks could borrow excess reserves 
needed to avoid the penalty rate, not only for 
their own accounts, but also for riskless lending 
to lower-quality banks, with repayment assured 
by irrevocable Fedwire transfers. 
The supplemental balance approach would 
more successfully tie the cost of daylight funding 
to perceptions of a bank's credit quality in the 
interday markets (via a risk spread paid for sup- 
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Best available copyplemental balances). This seems to be the most 
effective of  the three pricing devices for injecting 
market discipline into the cost of funding 
payments. 
The simple fee proposal offers little protection 
against moral hazard to the extent that changes 
in payment practices fail to eliminate daylight 
overdrafts. Flat-rate pricing of assured access to 
daylight credit may discourage its use, but pro- 
vides no basis for scrutiny of  the credit quality of 
payor banks, and no risk-based market disincen- 
tive for payor banks to limit daylight funding of 
payments13 
The higher the proposed price, the more scope 
there will be for modifications in payment prac- 
tices to eliminate Fedwire daylight overdrafts. 
But, in the limit, if  sufficient modifications were 
not forthcoming,  a price above the federal funds 
rate would guarantee elimination of daylight 
overdrafts, no matter which proposal was 
adopted, because excess reserves would be the 
economical way to avoid the price. Charging this 
high price would transform each proposal into a 
variant of the penalty rate proposal. However, 
unless a substantial earnings rate was offered on 
overnight holdings of excess reserves, daylight 
overdraft elimination would be quite costly to the 
banking system. In any case, imposing this net 
cost on banks and their customers to eliminate 
daylight overdrafts would not avoid moral hazard 
to the extent that excess reserves would feed an 
extensive market in riskless daylight loans. 
IV.  Conclusion 
Fedwire daylight overdrafts of Federal Reserve 
deposit accounts create a moral hazard that pric- 
ing might reduce. Pricing could have the desired 
result to the extent that banks would respond by 
modifying payment practices, or by bringing 
payments-related credit needs under more effec- 
tive market discipline based on risk evaluation. 
Much of Fedwire payment and daylight over- 
draft volume can be traced to unsecured inter- 
bank lending and to settlement of securities- 
market trading. Rapid growth of these activities 
has taken place within the nationwide frame- 
work of free Fedwire daylight overdrafts. There is 
little basis in actual experience, therefore, for 
predicting the responsiveness to pricing of either 
Fedwire daylight overdrafts or the financial- 
market activities they reflect. 
The hope is that modifications in payment 
practices would be ~~ciently  responsive to 
price that there would be no need to test the 
strength of credit-market discipline; that moral 
hazard could be eliminated at relatively low cost. 
The danger is that payment practices would be 
unresponsive to price and that market discipline 
would not be engaged because of a large residual 
element of moral hazard in the form of priced day- 
light overdrafts or riskless daylight loans. If  this 
were to be the actual outcome, it would suggest 
that, in addition to efficient allocation of finan- 
cial resources, an insidious driving force in the 
rapid growth of interbank lending and securities- 
market trading in recent decades has been the 
moral hazard of  Fedwire daylight overdrafts. 
13  This may overslate the case in one way. Pricing would operate only 
on daylight overdrafts in excess of a "free" allowance, determined as a per- 
cent of capital. Price then depends on credit quality, in that capital influences 
price. Beyond that first step, however, no discipline from the market or  from 
regulatory credit evaluation would discourage additional bomowing. 
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